Lending to local governments: Risks and behaviour of Hungarian banks by Dániel Homolya & Gábor Szigel
INTRODUCTION: THE BOOM IN LOCAL
GOVERNMENT DEBT IN 2007
The development that led to this article is the recent sudden
increase in the indebtedness of Hungarian local governments:
over the past one and a half years, borrowing has almost
doubled in the sector, and net debt formation has deviated from
the cash deficit to a considerable extent (Chart 1). In previous
years, net borrowing by local governments was roughly equal to
their annual deficit, i.e. the amount borrowed was used for
financing the deficit. In 2007, however, local governments
borrowed some HUF 140 billion (0.5% of GDP) on aggregate,
which is more than sufficient to cover their cash deficit.
This strong boom in debt continued in 2008 Q1, and
although the disbursement of new loans dropped
significantly, it did not stop in Q2: thus in the course of 2008
H1, banks granted more than HUF 100 billion in new loans
to local governments (exchange rate adjusted, Chart 2). As a
result, the debt-to-GDP ratio in the sector (including
outstanding debts in loans and bonds) rose from 2.3% at the
end of 2006 to 3.2% in March 2008.
This borrowing boom was presumably due partly to the
uncertainty of the future financing position of local
governments, and partly to their fear of an eventual statutory
tightening of their borrowing, rather than a drastic change in
their current financial management.
2 This is confirmed by the
fact that for the time being, the additional amount borrowed
by local governments has been deposited in the banking
MNB BULLETIN • SEPTEMBER 2008 20
Over the past one and a half years, the amount of credit granted by banks to Hungarian local governments has doubled, and the
gap between their cash deficit and net additional indebtness has increased. This borrowing boom is not the result of a drastic
change in the financial management of local governments, but stems primarily of the fear of statutory tightening of borrowing
conditions and their propensity to hold reserves. As the current statutory regulation does not represent an effective restriction on
debt, indebtedness in the sector is limited only by the market – i.e. banks’ lending propensity. Although it is not unprecedented
in international practice that this kind of market coordination may – with minor fluctuations – be able to keep indebtedness at
an acceptable level, the uncertainties in the financial management of local governments and the weak transparency related to
their long-term or contingent liabilities mean that the conditions for this kind of coordination are not fully in place in Hungary.
Our survey of banks underpins this assumption, revealing that due to the sharp competition between banks, local governments
are in a strong bargaining position vis-à-vis credit institutions, as – due to the lack of information and a high level of uncertainty
– credit institutions are limited in the use of more sophisticated risk assessment techniques generally used in the corporate sector,
and thus their lending is based on the expected continuity of local government operations.
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1The authors’wish to express their gratitude to Gábor P. Kiss (MNB), Attila Béres (NFÜ), András Vígvári (ÁSZ–FEMI) and lending officers who participated in the bank
interviews for the assistance they have provided. Responsibility for any mistakes which may have remained in the study lies with the authors alone.
2 In November 2007, the Ministry of Finance prepared a proposal for amending the Act on Local Governments, recommending, amongst others, amendment of the
current borrowing limit. The proposal, which is still on the agenda of Parliament, can be adopted by two thirds of the votes. The content of the proposal is outlined
in: (Vígvári, 2007).system. The amount of ‘excess deposits’ is in the range of
HUF 200 billion (0.8% of GDP), which means that current
deposits of local governments exceed the ‘usual’ deposits by
this amount (Chart 2).
Debt was contracted mainly in the form of long-term bonds
issued by local governments and subscribed by banks (Chart
2). The choice of bond-based financing merely had a
technical significance: bonds are accounted in the banks’ own
books, and the management of these transactions does not
essentially differ from that of regular loan transactions. (For
this reason, unless specifically noted otherwise, the issuing of
bonds will henceforth be included in borrowing.) The
attractiveness of bonds lies in the fact that that they allow
local governments to circumvent announcing public
procurement tenders.
The borrowing boom increased the accounts receivable by
the bank sector from local governments not only in terms of
absolute value, but also relative to their total exposure and
regulatory capital. The share of local governments in bank
lending and securities exposure rose from 2.7% in late 2006
to 3.3% in June 2008, while in the same period the
aggregate local government exposure increased from 22.8%
to 32.7%.
This sudden outflow of loans raises the following questions
in terms of financial stability:
• Regarding local governments: What risks are involved in
the indebtedness of local governments? Is the appropriate
use of the loans ensured?
• Regarding regulatory issues: Do the mechanisms designed
to ensure the soundness of local government indebtedness
either on the demand or on the supply side (statutory and
regulatory conditions as well as market trends) function
properly?
• Regarding banks: What risk is involved for the system of
credit institutions in the increased exposure of local
governments? To what extent can banks’ practice (i.e. the
fact that they hurried to satisfy the burgeoning borrowing
demand by local governments) be considered as a practice
of responsible lenders?
In the following, we attempt to answer these questions.
DEMAND: LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
WHICH BORROW AND THEIR FINANCIAL
MANAGEMENT
Presenting an overall assessment of financial management in
the local government sector is beyond the purpose and scope
of this study and, as noted above, another reason for
dropping the idea of a comprehensive survey is that the
2007-2008 borrowing boom was for the most part not
directed at deficit financing. For this reason, only the most
significant features and risks of financial management are
discussed in this chapter.
The first of these issues is the fact that in a European
comparison the deficit of Hungarian local governments
seems to be high (Chart 3) not only relative to GDP, but also
compared to the expenditures of the sector. An adequate
comparison should, of course, consider the differences
between the state administration systems of the individual
countries, as well as the fact that the current indebtedness of
Hungarian local governments is relatively low (3.1% of GDP
at the end of 2007), especially in comparison to certain
Western European countries. If, however, the current deficit
level is maintained, debt may gradually rise and the
sustainability of the local government sector would require
further investigation.
In financial terms, Hungarian local governments are
characterised by substantial concentration. In 2007, 85% of
LENDING TO LOCAL GOVERNMENTS: RISKS AND BEHAVIOUR OF HUNGARIAN BANKS
MNB BULLETIN • SEPTEMBER 2008 21
4 In interpreting this chart, it must be taken into account that due to the significant strengthening of the forint in 2008 H2, increase in loans and bonds was less in the
accounts than in reality. Expressed in the original currencies, the rise is faster. In turn, net borrowing is adjusted for exchange rates, thus providing a realistic picture
of actual borrowing.
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Source: MNB.the total revenues of the sector
5 were raised and 93% of the
balance-sheet liabilities owed by the five hundred local
governments with the largest proprietary income (and the
local government of Budapest alone accounted for 10.5% of
the proprietary revenues and 22.3% of the liabilities). This
means that a few hundred of the 3200 local governments
comprise the segment capable of resourceful business
management and investment, and that these local
governments are of sufficient weight to be considered as
potential clients for credit institutions. In addition, there is a
‘periphery’ of a large number of local governments with
extremely small budgets, which can expect funds only from
government support (local governments in a disadvantaged
position for reasons beyond their control and inoperable
local governments). Although their situation may be
worrying from other perspectives, in terms of financial
stability their systemic significance is negligible.
Although the debt of the five hundred largest income local
governments varies greatly, the number of more indebted local
governments clearly increased last year. Whereas in 2006
liabilities exceeded proprietary revenues only in the case of 34
local governments, in 2007 this number more than doubled,
rising to 74 (Chart 4).
6 These 74 institutions – including the local
government of Budapest – owed more than half of all liabilities,
while they shared only 25% of the proprietary revenues in the
local government sector. This means that local government debt
arises from a relatively small number of entities.
Generally speaking, the local governments which borrowed
in 2007 and 2008 were those that were less indebted at the
end of 2006, and changes in indebtedness had no correlation
with the rise in the operating costs of the individual local
governments. This again supports the assumption that the
2007 borrowing boom was primarily motivated by reserve
accumulation and did not relate to actual financing needs.
One fact suggesting that there is some degree of controlling
power exercised by the market is that local governments with
higher debts at the end of 2006 were granted far fewer loans
compared to the sector average.
Another unavoidable problem of local government debt is the
high level of uncertainty and limited transparency which
characterises the future state of financial management in the
sector:
1. On the one hand, a significant part of local government
incomes – 70% in 2007 (even in the case of the largest
institutions) – depends directly or indirectly on the central
government budget.
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4 In countries where Eurostat differentiates separate local government and federal levels (Germany, Austria, Spain and Belgium), the federal level was not considered in
the data published by us. 
5 For the purposes of this study local governments’own or proprietary revenues mean their current and assigned (tax) revenues, excluding cumulative revenues (e.g.
income from privatisation), normative support from the state and other subsidies, or even the funds granted by the European Union. This is a wider-than-usual
definition of proprietary income, which differs from the one applied in the Act on Local Governments (the latter is used in Chapter II). The reason why we considered
the wider sense of the term here is that – with certain limitations – this is perhaps the best to grasp the essence of the freely disposable earnings of local governments
from the data available.
6 In this segment, average indebtedness compared to proprietary revenues increased from 62.9% in late 2006 to 73.0% (projected for the entire sector, this indicator
deteriorated from 59.2% to 66.4%). 
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Source: Hungarian State Treasury (MÁK).2. On the other hand, the financial management of local
governments is also characterised by low transparency.
There are numerous signs suggesting that certain local
governments realise investment projects – for example,
using PPP constructions – in such a manner that the local
government budget is only debited at a later point in time,
or the costs are spread over time and thus imposing a
burden on the local government budget for a long period.
These cases can be considered as concealed borrowings
(Hegedûs–Tönkõ, 2006). Although local governments
complete forms on the time schedule of debts, exhaustive
data on all future commitments (including PPP schemes)
are unavailable. Another clear example of the
postponement of liabilities can be found in bond issues
with deferred principal redemption, which is expected to
cause approximately HUF 10-13 billion of additional cash
expenditure to local governments from 2010-2012, when
the grace period granted for principal repayment ends.
7
This amounts to 13%-17% of their deficit. Due to the
lack of information on such future and contingent
liabilities, it is difficult to judge the actual financial state
of the sector.
3. Thirdly, local governments can also become indebted via
companies which they own, without debiting the current
budgets. As these companies are primarily engaged in the
provision of public services, sooner or later the owners
(local governments) will have to meet the liabilities
incurred by these companies (furthermore, according to
information provided by banks, the loans granted to such
companies are frequently covered by local government
guarantees). The amount of loans granted to local
government companies is significant: according to the
following estimate, it amounts to 25%-30% of the total
debt of the local government sector, or roughly 0.6%-
0.8% of GDP.
We tried to estimate the debts of local governments on the
basis of data available from the court of registration. The data
show that 1,551 companies were registered with at least 50%
local government ownership in 2006. The total amount of
loans granted to these companies amounted to HUF 164.5
billion (excluding supplier credit and liabilities to owners).
The strong financial concentration which is characteristic of
local governments can also be observed in case of these
companies: in respect of the aforementioned total amount of
debt the first ten companies with the largest debts accounted
for approximately 60% of this sum, and first one hundred
companies accounted for 90% of this total debt. In 2006,
more than one-third of these one hundred companies closed
the year with a loss.
On the basis of the information currently available,
8 the
borrowing boom observed in the case of company owners is
likely not to have taken place via local government-owned
companies. Therefore, based on data for 2006, the total
amount of debt owed by these companies is estimated at HUF
170-200 billion. This estimate has essentially been confirmed
by our bank survey, which revealed that the loans granted to
companies in local government ownership amounted to
around 3%-4% of the banks’ corporate loan portfolio and
approximately 20% of local government exposure.
In addition to indebtedness, loans for reserve maintenance
purposes also involve risks:
1. On the one hand, because the currency of new loans and
bonds was the CHF in most cases while the deposits are
usually denominated in HUF, a considerable open position
has been generated in the local government sector, even
though the affected local governments realise gains on the
difference between the HUF and FX interest rates (in some
cases, this may be an important incentive for borrowing).
2. On the other hand, as these funds have not yet been spent,
for the time being they have increased the general
government debt without affecting the balance (deficit).
Thus one risk associated with these funds is that they may
be spent all at once, triggering a considerable one-off rise in
the general government deficit (amounting to 0.5% of
GDP). If, however, these funds are spent gradually – a more
likely scenario – the effect will be spread over time.
3. Thirdly, based on our bank survey detailed below, in many
cases the purposes of these funds were stated in rather
vague terms, and thus there is also risk of them being used
for projects which are not thought through carefully
enough.
As for the use of these funds, numerous experts cite
preparation for funding from the European Union as a
motive for the recent borrowing by local governments. This
argument is based on the fact that in the planning period
between 2007-2013 more funds from EU sources will be
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7This estimation was based on the fact that since mid-2007 local governments have issued long-term (20-25 year) bonds with principal repayment deferred by 3-5 years
in excess of HUF 200 billion. Thus, the principal instalments of these bonds must be repaid after 2010-2012. Repayment in equal amounts and 15-20 years to maturity
were presumed with the estimated HUF 10-13 billion.
8This was confirmed by the information provided to us by banks as well as the most recent data on the indebtedness of certain high priority companies in local
government ownership and monitored by MNB, which were granted approximately half of the loans allocated in 2006, revealing a mere 9% increase in 2007.made available than in the previous periods: in a working
paper prepared in early 2007,
9 the National Development
Agency estimated the allocation of HUF 1,470 billion from
the Structural Funds and HUF 717 billion from the Cohesion
Fund to local governments in this period. According to these
calculations, these projects require HUF 219 billion of own
contribution (approximately 0.9% of GDP), and non-eligible
costs – estimated at 30% of the project costs – are also
required for the projects (a total amount of approximately
HUF 656 billion, or 2.6% of GDP).
This is substantially more than the own contribution required
for the total amount of HUF 279 billion in support granted
from the Structural Fund and the Cohesion Fund to local
governments in the planning period between 2004-2007,
which amounted to a total of HUF 72.2 billion according to
the project documents (although non-eligible costs were
disregarded in this case).
10 The latter amount is roughly one-
third of the net total borrowed from the banking sector in the
period 2004 to 2007.
Thus, the EU transfers scheduled for local governments has
increased fourfold on an annual basis, while the required
minimum own contribution doubled relative to the previous
planning period. Based on the above, the approximately HUF
200-250 billion in ‘excess credit’ granted to local
governments during the current borrowing boom does not
appear to be a high amount. Nevertheless, the crowding-out
effect of EU transfers on local government projects financed
solely from own funds must also be taken into consideration.
This trend was already detected in the 2004-2007 period.
Despite the fact that considerable EU transfers were already
received by local governments during that period, the sector’s
projects compared to GDP – after adjustment for the election
years – remained at the previous 1.6%-1.8% (thus, as a result
of the support granted by the European Union, no upturn
was seen in local government projects). Consequently, part of
the projects supported by the European Union are likely not
to generate additional financing requirement for local
governments in comparison to the previous periods.
APPROACH TO LOCAL GOVERNMENT
DEBT AND ITS REGULATION IN AN
INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT
One concern frequently cited in relation to decentralised
state administration systems is the fact that the lack of fiscal
discipline at the lower levels of administration may cause
serious macro-economic imbalances. Over the past 20-30
years the central budget has had to intervene due to the
insolvency of lower level public administration units in 19 of
44 countries analysed in a study (Singh-Plekhanov, 2005). In
certain countries, such as Argentina and Brazil, the financial
difficulties of local (federal) governments created serious
costs for the national economy and contributed to the
emergence of financial crises. Although in the current
Member States of the European Union, local government
debt has not resulted in major problems recently, examples of
central assistance to certain local governments can be recalled
from the 1990s (e.g. in Germany and Sweden).
Similar worries have been expressed in connection with
Hungarian local governments for two reasons. On the one
hand, the Hungarian local governments sector is rather
sizeable: its aggregate expenses amount to about 12% of
GDP – ranking it among medium-sized local government
sectors in the European Union – and, for this reason,
imbalances in this sector could be felt at a macro-economic
level. On the other hand, Hungarian local governments are
fairly independent in respect of their financial management,
with enough freedom to potentially mismanage their assets.
(It must also be noted that so far, fiscal shocks have primarily
been caused by the central government in Hungary.)
The authoritative literature in this field (Ter-Minassian–
Craig, 1997) distinguishes four fundamental systems in the
regulation of local government indebtedness:
• market discipline (no limits are set, and satisfaction of the
credit requirements of local governments depends solely on
market participants’ lending propensity);
• direct controls (lending is subject to approval by the central
government);
• rules-based approaches (rules set out in statutory acts
regulate debt);
• co-operative approach (the heads of local governments
decide on debt in agreement with a central body in co-
operation).
Theoretically, from among these alternative methods the
Hungarian system is rule-based, as the Act on Local
Governments (Act LXV of 1990) determines an annual
maximum debt service for local governments. The essence of
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9 Despite the fact that the referenced decision-preparation material was compiled approximately one and a half years ago, no other recent analysis is known to us.
10 Data were provided by the National Development Agency. The support disbursed by the Cohesion Fund was taken into consideration without the projects transferred
from the pre-accession programmes to the Cohesion Fund, supported by the European Union in the amount of HUF 80.1 billion. In the case of financing requirements
it must be taken into consideration that local governments can also rely on the own contribution fund established by the Ministry of Local Government, with a limit
of about HUF 15 billion in 2008.this regulation is that the annual liabilities undertaken by local
governments (including all financing costs, primarily loan
repayment, debiting the particular year) may not exceed 70%
of their own proprietary revenues minus short-term liabilities.
For the time being, however, this legislation is incapable of
limitation for three reasons. One of them is that local
government debt is still far below the maximum level set
forth in the act (see the box below). The other is that – due
to the abovementioned uncertainties in financial
management and the lack of transparency – it is difficult to
keep in mind the limits required for future compliance with
the statutory maximum when assuming current liabilities. In
other words: as the management of local governments will
not be responsible for compliance 5-10 years on, in most
cases it does not constrain the representative bodies from
borrowing at present. The third reason is that there is no
penalty for exceeding the borrowing limit.
For this reason, the current regulation fails to set penalties
and remains a theoretical rather than an effective limit, and
the Hungarian system operates in a quasi-market controlled
way. According to the literature (e.g. Ter-Minassian–Craig,
1997), regimes based on such market co-ordination can
function more or less satisfactorily if the markets are open
and free, sufficient and  satisfactory quality information is
available on the financial situation of the debtors, and there
have been no previous cases requiring central government
bailout. A good example for the successful application of
such solutions is Canada, where each federal state has an
external credit rating. Nevertheless, even the Canadian
LENDING TO LOCAL GOVERNMENTS: RISKS AND BEHAVIOUR OF HUNGARIAN BANKS
MNB BULLETIN • SEPTEMBER 2008 25
11 As these items of the financial management of local governments fail to fully comply with the provisions of Section 88 of the Act on Local Governments, we may have
slightly underestimated their proprietary income and overestimated their short-term liabilities – primarily liquid credit. Therefore, we may have underestimated the
total debt limit. This is supported by the fact that based on the consolidated data of form 25 of the borrowing limit of local governments, the borrowing limit of the
sector was HUF 409.8 billion in 2007 (for lack of any available data, we could not adjust this value for the local governments exceeding the borrowing limit).
12When the parameters used for the estimation were set, we relied on the assumption that the term of loans granted to local governments generally does not exceed
10 years, however, the bonds they issue mature over 20 years in general. Possible interest rates were set on the basis of the nominal CHF interest rates of local
government bonds registered by KELER (Central Clearing House and Depository) and MNB (central bank of Hungary) (for the most part below 6%). For the purposes
of calculation, we disregarded the product attributes provided with local government lending products such as grace period for principal repayment, which may add
to the borrowing possibilities of local governments.
Based on 2007 data on the financial management of local governments,
we attempted to estimate their maximum indebtedness allowed by the
effective statutory regulation, relying on the budget reports and balance
sheets of local governments.
11The 440 local governments with short-term
liabilities exceeding proprietary income, i.e. those which violated the
statutory indebtedness limit in 2007, were excluded from the data. Most
of these are small villages, however, there are two larger towns and two
county governments as well. (These local governments share
approximately 3% of the total amount of proprietary revenues generated
in the sector, thus this segment is insignificant for the time being.)
The data thus adjusted suggest that the local governments raised
proprietary revenues required by law of HUF 663.4 billion, while their
short-term liabilities amounted to HUF 137.7 billion. 70% of the
difference between the two is HUF 368 billion, which is the cap on their
debt. However, this is only an annual maximum set for liabilities (i.e. one
year’s ‘repayment instalment’). Presuming repayment in equal amounts,
but with various maturities and interest rates, according to our
estimation (Table 1), local governments could borrow an additional HUF
2,000-4,000 billion (approximately 8%-16% of GDP) before they reach
the statutory maximum, about 2.5-5 times the HUF 800 billion credit
liabilities they currently have.
12
However, in this estimate one must remember that the statutory limit
may automatically decrease if future amendments of the act are taken
into consideration and certain contingent or future liabilities are
included in the balance sheet, while no new loans are granted. In the
case of local government bonds issued with deferred principal
repayment, the end of the ‘grace period’ alone increases short-term
expenses in the current year.
Possible level of local government indebtedness allowed by statutory regulation
Table 1
Possible additional borrowing by local governments, assuming annual ‘repayment’of HUF 368 billion
(HUF billion)
Average term to presumed interest 4% 6% 8%
Average 10-year loan term 2,620 2,300 2,040
Average 20-year loan term 4,080 3,340 2,820
Source: Authors’ calculation.system was unable to prevent ‘excessive indebtedness’ of the
federal states in the early 1990s, which had to be offset by
painful austerity measures later on. (The efficiency of market
control is uncertain in general, as well as on the level of the
central budget: this is exactly the reason why, among others,
the Maastricht criteria were adopted in the European Union,
and in the example of Canada above, the individual federal
states also adopted self-regulatory provisions.)
Thus the question is whether the conditions of market
control apply in the Hungarian local government system, at
least with more or less efficiency. In our opinion, this is
highly doubtful. Although the central government has not
been required to assist in debt settlement proceedings so far,
13
due to the uncertainties in financial management and the lack
of transparency mentioned in the previous section, even
professional lenders can enforce the criterion regarding
adequate information to a limited extent only. This is
substantiated by the following discussion of banking
practices.
SUPPLY: LENDING TO LOCAL
GOVERNMENTS IN COMMERCIAL
BANKING PRACTICE
The recent boom in borrowing by local governments was
carried out for the most part through the Hungarian banking
system. Although the local government sector also owes
approximately HUF 118 billion to foreign banks through the
European Investment Bank (granted for the underground
project in Budapest and the European cultural capital project
of Pécs), HUF 621 billion of the HUF 670 billion domestic
loans and bonds were financed by Hungarian banks (end-
June 2008 data).
In order to get a better understanding of lender
considerations, we conducted a survey in June 2008 based on
interviews with the six market leader credit institutions in the
local government sector. Based on their closing stocks on 30
June 2008, these institutions constitute 94% of the
Hungarian bank sector’s exposure (loans and bonds) to
Hungarian local governments.
14 In the course of our survey
the banks’ experts were asked questions regarding business as
well as risk developments.
According to the respondents, market competition has clearly
become more intense among local governments over the past
12 months, and this resulted in a deterioration in their
bargaining positions. Some of the local governments
consciously capitalised on this situation and announced
public procurement procedures and bond issue tenders with
short deadlines, and margins are just as low in this sector –
especially in the case of larger local governments – as in the
sector of large companies. In addition, lending conditions –
such as maturity, the specification of loan purposes and
collateral – are also set by the local governments (at least in
the case of local governments with relatively low levels of
debt, as such transactions are considered more desirable for
banks). Furthermore, last year the following business trends
emerged:
• The fact that bonds gained ground – although initially
they were probably meant to avoid public procurement
procedures – affected product structure. While earlier
loans were generally granted to local governments with
10-year maturity, bonds usually mature in 20-25 years
(based on data from KELER, nearly 60% of the bonds
issued in 2007-2008 mature after 20 years, and 8%-9% of
them have maturities exceeding 20 years). Consequently,
the average term of liabilities undertaken by local
governments has considerably been extended (Table 2).
Moreover, due to deferred principal repayment
opportunities, repayment costs are lower for the
transitional 3-5 years. In comparison: in corporate
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13 Local governments in disadvantaged situation for reasons beyond their control cannot be considered in this scope.
14The interviewed banks accounted for 88% of the gross portfolio increase that took place between June 2007 and June 2008.
Source: MNB, on the basis of data provided by the credit institutions participating in the survey.
Maturity distribution of exposures 31 Dec. 2006 31 Dec. 2007 31 Dec. 2008
Less than a year 47.4% 17.7% 13.2%
Between 1 and 5 years 12.9% 11.4% 7.5%
Between 5 and 10 years 14.2% 19.7% 13.9%
Between 10 and 15 years 11.3% 16.5% 14.3%
Over 15 years 14.2% 34.6% 51.0%
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Table 2
Maturity composition of the local government portfolios of the surveyed bankslending and project financing, loans granted for more
than 7-8 years are extremely rare.
• Although the overwhelming majority of bank loans were
granted credit for the purpose of investment projects, the
emergence of bonds has made the determination of loan
purposes uncertain. While in the past banks made clear
efforts to lend on the condition of clearly defined purposes
(although this could not be enforced by every bank and in
every case), in the case of bonds, accurate specification of
the purpose of financing is problematic, partly because of
the long term. Despite this fact, some banks attempt to
supervise the use of the disbursed amounts (e.g. the transfer
is subject to the submission of a signed main contracting
agreement), while others disregard this question. Based on
the data of the interviewed credit institutions,
approximately 10% of the financing granted to local
governments is used for operating, and about 40% for
unspecified or unknown purposes. Based on one credit
institution’s estimation, about 30% of the issued local
government bonds are used for operating purposes.
• In the case of subsidised loans with preferential refinancing
facilities, more detailed documentation and more specific
investment goals are required in general. In subsidised
refinancing, the Hungarian Development Bank plays a
pivotal role, along with a few foreign banks, mainly the
EIB. The essence of this facility is that with access to
preferential refinancing, commercial banks can grant
project loans or subscribe to bonds issued for development
purposes for local governments under more favourable
terms, while keeping the lending risk in their own
portfolios. Subsidised facilities amount to nearly 20% of
the exposure to local governments of those participating in
the survey.
•  Similarly to other fields, mediating agents have a
considerable role in lending to local governments. Both in
public procurement procedures and in closed tenders
based on invitation, agents frequently participate as
consultants in preparing documentation and assisting
evaluation. In consideration for their contribution, they
are paid commissions by the banks. Access to clients
through agents is an established banking practice in the
retail segment. However, in relation to local governments,
this method seems to be less obvious path, due to the
tenders announced on a competitive basis. The responding
bank experts did indeed doubt the value that such
consultants/mediating agents could provide added value to
the deal.
• Few banks use proactive sales strategies. Credit institutions
basically react to the announced public procurement and
bond tenders, and therefore borrowing is essentially
initiated by local governments.
In addition to these aspects, bank experts identified the
following risk management problems:
• Lack of transparency, a high level of uncertainty in future
and contingent liabilities as well as commitments not
included in the debt portfolio. Due to these problems
mentioned above, the future cash-flow of local
governments is difficult to plan. For this reason, most
banks make projections based on the past management data
and attempt at planning future flows on the basis of any
available customised data, although they are aware of the
shortcomings of this method (if the loan is granted for the
purposes of a specific project goal, they also analyse return
on the project).
• In the case of loans, public procurement procedures are
often too short, while in the case of bonds, the tender
deadlines are short, therefore banks are not given sufficient
time for prudent client and deal rating.
• The applied rating schemes are based on expert judgement
based estimates or foreign parent bank models, as the client
data available for most banks are insufficient for developing
their own models based on statistics (non-performance is
also rare in the local government sector). Thus, for the time
being, the reliability of these ratings is doubtful.
•  At present, banks have very little experience in local
government bankruptcy, as the number of such cases has
been extremely low in the past decade. The settlement of
local government debt is regulated in Act XXV of 1996,
which sets out a clear framework for cases of insolvency
and can be considered an excellent statutory regulation
even by international standards. The purpose of the act is
to provide for the recovery of the solvency of local
governments in bankruptcy proceedings in addition to
performing their mandatory duties and satisfying creditor
claims in proportion to the disposable assets. Since the
adoption of the act in 1996, debt settlement proceedings
have been started in no more than 28 cases altogether
(Jókay, 2007; IGE, 2008), and only in the case of small
villages, excluded from the circle of institutions having key
significance – and characteristically borrowing from banks
– as mentioned in Chapter 1 above. Thus in these cases,
bankruptcy proceedings were basically initiated in the
interest of meeting liabilities to suppliers, and the banks
involved in our survey were not affected.
• The repayment of local government loans is guaranteed
primarily by their cash-flows, and although there are deals
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guarantees (in most cases provided by Garantiqa
Hitelgarancia Zrt.), they cannot be considered typical in
this sector (Table 3). Local governments usually do not
offer real estate as collateral, and banks do not encourage
it either, as the legal procedure of obtaining the title to real
estate is complex. Most local governments consider the
costs of unconditional payment guarantees too expensive,
and they are also subject to a requirement for more
accurate specification of the loan objectives. For this
reason, in this field banks typically take the initiative to
include Garantiqa in the lending transaction, if they are
unable to assume the risks involved. Some of the
unconditional payment guarantees provided by Garantiqa
to local governments are secured by the re-guarantees of
EIB. Changes related to collateral are well illustrated in a
survey conducted in 2000: at that time, nearly 40% of the
loans granted to local governments were covered by real
estate, and revenues from fees or taxes were offered for
approximately 35% (Barati, 2000).
Despite these problems, in absolute terms banks consider the
risks involved lending to local governments as low for the
reasons of the continuity in their operation. In other words,
despite the uncertainties, credit institutions are not afraid of
suffering major losses in their local government portfolios
because local governments – in contrast to corporations –
cannot be liquidated or wound up even if they go bankrupt,
and – in contrast to retail clients – their sources of income
cannot dry up completely. Interestingly, the majority of bank
experts do not expect assistance from the central budget even
in the case of local government bankruptcy, but they do
expect that even insolvent local governments will sooner or
later repay their liabilities from their own revenues – by
rescheduling their loans and cutting their expenses.
In addition, banks consider the cross-selling opportunities
opened up to the clients of local governments through
lending to be important, which is actually another incentive
for lending. In addition to credit and bond issues, credit
institutions offer a wide range of products ranging from
current account management to option deals to their local
government clients. Banks expect that if they can develop
favourable co-operation with the local governments through
their financing facilities, they may be more likely to be
commissioned with the provision of liabilities-side products,
investment and ‘treasury’ transactions and gain advantage at
subsequent public procurement procedures and other
tenders.
Not only were the risks of lending to local governments
lower than those of lending to companies, but their capital
requirements as well, as their risk weighting was only 50%,
instead of 100%. Simultaneously, with the adoption of the
European capital requirement directive (Basel II), the use of a
simpler standard method might have resulted in the increase
of the capital requirement. The reason for this is that
pursuant to the new regulation, exposures to local
governments are assigned weights identical with credit
institutions and investment businesses, i.e. one category
worse than the risk rating of the Hungarian central
government. Depending on which rating agency’s
classification is used, this may have increased the risk weight
of exposures to local governments from 50% to as much as
100%. However, banks did not report cases in which the
business activities of a local government would have been
affected by the eventual change in the capital requirement
(just as previously the attraction of this market segment had
not been its lower capital requirement).
CONCLUSIONS
The underlying reason for the major ‘credit boom’ of
Hungarian local governments in late 2007 and early 2008
was basically reserve maintenance, rather than a drastic
increase in the operational deficit. For the time being, the
indebtedness of local governments does not represent a
substantial risk for the financial system, as banks’ exposure to
this sector is low. If, however, these portfolios are further
extended, significant risks might arise.
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Source: MNB, on the basis of data provided by the credit institutions participating in the survey.
Collateral ratio and distribution by collateral types 30 June 2008
Credit to collateral ratio (%) 16.88%





Features of collateral for the local government portfolios of the banks surveyedAlthough the Hungarian system of local governments is
rather fragmented, concern over debt only affects a small
group of a few hundred larger institutions in this sector. The
sustainability of their indebtedness requires further
investigation, which , however, is primarily prevented by the
high uncertainty and lack of transparency characteristic of
local governments.
At present, the statutory regulation of local governments’
indebtedness does not impose an effective limitation on debt,
and borrowing in this sector is currently (and for the
foreseeable future) controlled by the market – in other words,
by the lending propensity of the creditor banks. This practice
is not unknown in other countries, and despite its weaknesses,
there are examples of its fairly successful application.
Nonetheless, the efficiency of market control in Hungary is
impaired by the shortage of information resulting from the
uncertainties of local government management, which is a
challenge for credit institutions as well. Thus the question
arises: to what extent are banks capable of gauging the
likelihood that a local government will actually become
insolvent and its consequences (and act as appropriate market
controllers). Our survey of banks show that credit institutions
have confidence in the continuity of local governments’
operation.
As the problem of indebtedness affects only in a small group
of local governments (as mentioned above), the creation of a
regulatory environment channelling the debt of this group
towards a framework, perhaps by the adoption of
administrative measures or the promotion of market
mechanisms could be an approach worth considering. In both
cases, the transparency of financial management would need
to be increased, a requirement which is not unrealistic vis-à-
vis local governments, which are in principle more
sophisticated than the sector average.
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